The Smithsonian Agreement was a deal reached on 17 and 18 December 1971 by the Group of Ten leading economies, meeting at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, to rebuild a system of fixed exchange rates after President Nixon had ended the dollar's convertibility into gold. Under the deal, the US devalued the dollar by raising the official gold price from $35 to $38 an ounce, other countries revalued their currencies against the dollar, and the bands within which currencies could move were widened. President Nixon hailed it as "the most significant monetary agreement in the history of the world". By March 1973 it had collapsed and the major currencies were floating.

Dates17 and 18 December 1971
WhoThe Group of Ten (G10) major economies
Gold priceRaised from $35 to $38 an ounce
BandsWidened to 2.25% either side of the new rates
ExampleYen revalued from 360 to 308 per dollar
EndGeneralised floating by March 1973

Why a new deal was needed

On 15 August 1971 President Nixon stopped foreign governments from exchanging dollars for gold and imposed a 10% surcharge on imports, the event known as the Nixon Shock. Currency markets were thrown into confusion. Some currencies floated, others were held at their old rates, and governments were angry about the surcharge. Trade and investment needed some stability, and the US wanted other countries to accept a cheaper dollar.

Through the autumn finance ministers bargained over how much each currency should move. The US used the import surcharge as leverage: it would drop the tax once its partners agreed to revalue.

What was agreed

The main terms of the Smithsonian Agreement$38Dollar devaluedOfficial gold priceraised from $35 to $38an ounce↑Others revaluedYen, Deutsche Mark andothers rose against thedollar2.25%Wider bandsCurrencies could move2.25% either side ofthe new rates0%Surcharge droppedThe US removed its 10%import surchargeSource: Federal Reserve History; G10 communiqué, December 1971fxrecap.com
A bigger cushion around new fixed rates.

Raising the gold price to $38 cut the dollar's value by about 8% against gold. The larger change came from other currencies being revalued: the Japanese yen, for example, moved from 360 to 308 per dollar, a revaluation of about 17%, and the Deutsche Mark was also revalued significantly. Wider 2.25% bands, compared with 1% under Bretton Woods, were meant to give central banks more room before they had to intervene.

Yen per US dollar3601949 to 1971308Smithsonian, Dec1971Source: Japan Ministry of Finance; Smithsonian Agreementfxrecap.com
The yen's fixed rate had not changed for 22 years.

Why it did not last

The agreement fixed the symptoms but not the cause. Dollars still could not be exchanged for gold, US inflation and deficits continued, and money flowed freely between countries in search of the strongest currency. In 1972 European countries created their own narrower band, known as the "snake in the tunnel", to keep their currencies closer together within the wider Smithsonian limits. Britain dropped out and let sterling float in June 1972 after heavy selling.

Pressure on the dollar returned in early 1973. In February the US devalued again, raising the official gold price to $42.22. Within weeks speculation forced the closure of currency markets once more, and by March the major currencies were floating against the dollar. The Smithsonian Agreement had lasted about fourteen months, and it was the last serious attempt to restore a world system of fixed exchange rates.

Bretton Woods vs the Smithsonian AgreementBretton Woods (1944)Smithsonian (1971)Dollar convertible into gold at $35No gold convertibilityBands of 1% either sideBands of 2.25% either sideLasted about 25 yearsLasted about 14 monthsSource: FX Recapfxrecap.com
Without gold behind the dollar, the fixed rates had no anchor.

Who negotiated it

The talks were led on the American side by Treasury Secretary John Connally, the forceful Texan who had pushed for the Nixon Shock, with Paul Volcker, then a senior Treasury official, doing much of the detailed work. European finance ministers and central bankers, along with Japan's representatives, argued over every percentage point, because a larger revaluation of their own currency would hurt their exporters.

A key earlier step was a meeting between Nixon and French President Georges Pompidou in the Azores in mid-December 1971, where the two sides agreed the broad shape of a deal, including a devaluation of the dollar against gold. France had long criticised the dollar's privileged role, so its agreement cleared the way for the wider G10 settlement in Washington days later.

The final numbers reflected political bargaining as much as economics. Each country accepted a revaluation it could live with, and the US accepted a modest devaluation against gold that it hoped would end the crisis without reopening the gold window.

What happened to gold

The official price of $38 meant little in practice, because the US was no longer selling gold at that price to anyone. On the free market, gold traded well above the official level and kept rising as inflation picked up in the 1970s. After the second devaluation in 1973, to $42.22, the official price became largely symbolic, and gold has traded freely ever since.

Why Nixon's praise aged badly

Nixon's claim that it was the most significant monetary agreement in history is often quoted as a warning about political overconfidence. Economists see the agreement as a brief pause between two eras. Its real importance was to show that, once the link to gold had gone and capital could move freely, governments could not hold fixed exchange rates against market pressure for long. The floating system that replaced it is the one forex traders use today.

Illustrative case: a German exporter in 1972

Imagine a German machine maker that priced its exports in dollars. In 1971 each dollar earned brought in about 3.66 marks under the old Bretton Woods rate. After the Smithsonian revaluation, the same dollar brought in only about 3.22 marks, roughly 12% less. Within two years, as the dollar weakened further and currencies floated, it was worth even less. Companies learned to price contracts in their own currency or to hedge, practices that are standard today.

What the Smithsonian Agreement teaches traders

  • Fixed rates need an anchor. Without gold or strong policy behind them, they give way under pressure.
  • Wider bands buy time, not stability. Room to move only delays the reckoning if the underlying imbalance remains.
  • Politicians can be overconfident. Official praise for a currency deal is not evidence that it will last.
  • Capital flows decide. When money can move freely, the market tests every fixed rate.

Read how the floating era began in the Nixon Shock, and how governments later tried to steer floating rates in the Plaza Accord of 1985.

Cite this guide

FX Recap, "The Smithsonian Agreement of 1971: The Last Attempt to Fix Exchange Rates", updated 17 November 2026, https://fxrecap.com/learn-forex/education/smithsonian-agreement

Free to quote with a link. Journalists: data and comment in our press room.

Frequently asked

What was the Smithsonian Agreement?

A deal reached by the Group of Ten economies on 17 and 18 December 1971 in Washington to restore fixed exchange rates after the Nixon Shock. The dollar was devalued, other currencies were revalued and the bands around the new rates were widened to 2.25%.

How much was the dollar devalued in 1971?

The official gold price was raised from $35 to $38 an ounce, a devaluation of about 8% against gold. Other currencies were also revalued against the dollar, so the total change against some currencies, such as the yen, was larger.

Why did the Smithsonian Agreement fail?

The dollar was no longer convertible into gold, US deficits and inflation continued, and capital moved freely between countries. Speculative pressure returned in early 1973, the dollar was devalued again in February, and by March the major currencies were floating.

What was the snake in the tunnel?

An arrangement from 1972 under which European currencies kept within a narrower band of each other (the snake) while staying inside the wider Smithsonian limits against the dollar (the tunnel). It was a forerunner of the European Monetary System and the euro.

What did Nixon say about the Smithsonian Agreement?

He called it "the most significant monetary agreement in the history of the world". The agreement collapsed about fourteen months later, so the remark is often quoted as an example of political overconfidence.

Who negotiated the Smithsonian Agreement?

US Treasury Secretary John Connally led for the United States, with Paul Volcker doing much of the detailed work, alongside finance ministers and central bankers from the other G10 economies. A Nixon and Pompidou meeting in the Azores days earlier set the broad terms.

How did the Smithsonian Agreement affect the yen?

The yen was revalued from 360 per dollar, its fixed rate since 1949, to 308 per dollar, a rise of about 17%. It began floating in early 1973.