Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) was a US hedge fund that nearly collapsed in 1998 after Russia defaulted on its debt and devalued the rouble on 17 August, setting off a global rush into safe assets that its highly leveraged trades could not survive. Founded by the bond trader John Meriwether, with Nobel prize-winning economists Myron Scholes and Robert Merton among its partners, LTCM lost most of its capital in a matter of weeks. On 23 September 1998, fourteen banks and brokers put $3.6 billion into the fund in a rescue organised by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to prevent its failure from destabilising markets.

The story connects a currency and debt crisis in an emerging market with the near-failure of one of Wall Street's most admired firms, and it remains a key lesson in leverage and correlation risk.

TriggerRussia defaults and devalues the rouble, 17 August 1998
RoubleFrom about 6 to about 21 per US dollar by end of 1998
LTCMLost most of its capital, widely put at about $4.6bn
Rescue$3.6bn from 14 banks and brokers, 23 September 1998
Fed's roleOrganised the talks; lent none of its own money

Russia's crisis

By 1998 Russia was running large budget deficits, relying heavily on short-term government bonds known as GKOs, and holding the rouble within a managed band against the dollar. Falling oil prices and the aftermath of the Asian crisis made investors nervous, and money began to leave. Despite an international loan package, the pressure became too great.

On 17 August 1998 the government and central bank devalued the rouble, defaulted on domestic debt and declared a moratorium on some payments to foreign creditors. The rouble collapsed from about 6 per dollar to around 21 by the end of the year. Few investors had expected a nuclear-armed major economy to default on debt in its own currency.

Roubles per US dollarApproximate≈6Before 17 Aug 1998≈21End of 1998Source: Bank of Russia rates as widely reported; roundedfxrecap.com
The rouble lost about two thirds of its value in months.

Who LTCM were

LTCM launched in 1994 with some of the most respected names in finance. Its strategy was mostly relative-value trading: finding pairs of very similar securities, such as two government bonds, whose prices had drifted apart, and betting they would converge. Each trade made only a small profit, so LTCM used enormous leverage to make the returns meaningful. Reports later put its balance sheet at around $125 billion on less than $5 billion of capital, with derivatives positions far larger.

For several years the approach worked brilliantly, with returns of around 40% a year in its early years. The models assumed that markets would behave roughly as they had in the past, and that the different trades were unlikely to lose money all at once.

How the default broke the models

From Moscow to Greenwich in five weeks17 AugRussia defaultsRouble devalued, debtpayments suspendedLate AugFlight to safetyInvestors dump riskyassets, buy the safestbondsSeptSpreads widenLTCM's convergencetrades all move againstit at once23 SepRescueFourteen firms put in$3.6bn to avoid adisorderly failureSource: Federal Reserve History; FX Recap summaryfxrecap.com
A shock in one market triggered losses across all of LTCM's trades.

The Russian default triggered a global flight to safety. Investors sold almost anything risky and piled into the most liquid US Treasury bonds. Price gaps that LTCM had bet would narrow instead widened sharply, in many markets at the same time. Trades that were supposed to be unrelated all lost money together, and with leverage of around 25 times, small percentage losses wiped out huge amounts of capital. Others in the market knew LTCM's positions were large and avoided buying them, making it even harder to get out.

By September the fund had lost most of its capital, widely put at about $4.6 billion. Its counterparties, including many of the world's largest banks, faced big losses if it failed and its positions were dumped at once.

The rescue

The Federal Reserve Bank of New York brought LTCM's major creditors together. On 23 September 1998 fourteen banks and brokerage firms agreed to invest $3.6 billion in exchange for 90% of the fund, leaving the original partners and investors with 10%. The Fed did not lend any of its own money, but its involvement was controversial, because some critics argued it encouraged risk-taking by signalling that large firms would be saved. LTCM was wound down in an orderly way by early 2000, and the banks recovered their money.

What LTCM assumed vs what happenedModel assumptionsReality in 1998Trades were unrelatedAll trades lost togetherMarkets would stay liquidLiquidity vanishedPast volatility predicted the futureA rare shock broke the patternsSource: FX Recapfxrecap.com
Correlations jump towards one in a crisis.
Illustrative case: a convergence trade at home scale

Imagine a trader who buys EUR/USD and sells GBP/USD, betting that the gap between them will narrow, using 50:1 leverage because the gap usually moves only a few pips. In normal times the trade earns small, steady profits. Then a shock hits sterling and the euro differently, and the gap widens by 150 pips in two days. With so much leverage, that move takes most of the account. LTCM ran the same kind of logic at a vastly larger scale.

Strategies that win small and often can hide the risk of rare, large losses. If a strategy needs high leverage to make its returns worthwhile, ask what happens when the rare event arrives.

The wider market impact

The autumn of 1998 was one of the most stressful periods for global markets in decades. Emerging-market currencies and bonds sold off, credit spreads widened sharply and some markets briefly stopped functioning normally. The US Federal Reserve cut interest rates three times between September and November 1998 to calm conditions, a move that helped restore confidence and was credited with preventing a wider credit crunch.

Currency markets felt the shock too. In early October 1998 the US dollar fell sharply against the Japanese yen, dropping from about 136 to about 112 in a matter of days, as investors unwound yen carry trades funded with cheap yen borrowing, an early example of the kind of carry-trade unwind seen again in 2008 and 2024.

Lessons for traders

  • Leverage magnifies model errors. A small mistake becomes fatal when positions are many times your capital.
  • Correlations change in a crisis. Positions that look diversified can all move against you at once.
  • Liquidity disappears when you need it. Large positions are hardest to exit in a panic.
  • Brilliance is not protection. Even Nobel prize winners can be undone by risk they did not size for.

See how currency crises spread in the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and how to keep leverage under control in what is forex leverage.

Cite this guide

FX Recap, "LTCM and the 1998 Russian Default: When Genius Failed", updated 22 November 2026, https://fxrecap.com/learn-forex/education/ltcm-russia-1998

Free to quote with a link. Journalists: data and comment in our press room.

Frequently asked

What was LTCM?

Long-Term Capital Management, a US hedge fund founded in 1994 by John Meriwether, with Nobel laureates Myron Scholes and Robert Merton among its partners. It used heavy leverage on trades betting that small price gaps would close.

Why did LTCM fail?

Russia's default in August 1998 triggered a global flight to safety. The price gaps LTCM bet would narrow widened instead, across many markets at once, and its very high leverage turned those moves into losses that wiped out most of its capital.

What happened in the 1998 Russian crisis?

On 17 August 1998 Russia devalued the rouble, defaulted on domestic government debt and suspended some foreign debt payments. The rouble fell from about 6 to about 21 per dollar by the end of the year.

Did the government bail out LTCM?

Not with public money. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York organised a meeting of LTCM's creditors, and fourteen private banks and brokers invested $3.6 billion on 23 September 1998. No Fed money was lent.

How much did LTCM lose?

It lost most of its capital in 1998, a loss widely put at about $4.6 billion. The original partners and investors kept only 10% of the fund after the rescue.

How did the 1998 crisis affect the yen?

In early October 1998 the dollar fell sharply against the yen, from about 136 to about 112 in days, as investors unwound carry trades funded with cheap yen. It was one of the biggest short-term moves in a major pair at the time.

What book tells the LTCM story?

Roger Lowenstein's When Genius Failed (2000) is the best-known account of LTCM's rise and fall. It draws on interviews with people involved and is widely recommended to traders interested in leverage and risk.

What can forex traders learn from LTCM?

That high leverage magnifies small mistakes, that positions which seem unrelated can lose together in a crisis, and that liquidity can vanish just when you need to exit.